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Abstract
This paper examines how unhedged currency exposure of rms varies with changes
in currency 
exibility. A sequence of four time-periods with alternating high and low
currency volatility in India provides a natural experiment in which changes in cur-
rency exposure of a panel of rms is measured, and the moral hazard versus incom-
plete markets hypotheses tested. We nd that rms carried higher currency exposure
in periods when the currency was less 
exible. We also nd homogeneity of views,
where rms set themselves up to benet from a rupee appreciation, in the later two
periods. Our results support the moral hazard hypothesis that low currency 
exibil-
ity encourages rms to hold unhedged exposure in response to implicit government
guarantees.
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21 Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime has seen renewed debate among policy makers and
researchers in recent times (Ghosh et al., 2002; Ize and Yeyati, 2003; Fischer, 2006). One
possible rationale for currency pegging or the \fear of 
oating" in emerging markets is the
nancial fragility of banks and rms. It is argued that incomplete nancial markets in
emerging economies limit the capacity of rms to hedge their currency exposure, and that
the exposure of rms leads central banks to avoid currency 
exibility (Calvo and Reinhart,
2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003).
A second view identies the moral hazard created by currency pegs as a source of balance
sheet mismatches (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). When the central bank pegs the
exchange rate, low volatility against a target currency gives rms an implicit guarantee
against short term movements of the exchange rate. Burnside et al. (2001) and Schneider
and Tornell (2004) show that carrying unhedged currency exposure is an optimal response
on the part of rms enjoying government guarantees.
A recent theoretical literature (e.g. Chang and Velasco (2005)) suggests that the relation-
ship may hold both ways. A central bank chooses the exchange rate regime depending on
the extent of currency mismatches. The fear of 
oating may give rise to a peg. In turn,
the optimal response of rms to the implicit guarantee oered by the central bank is to
carry unhedged currency exposure. These two processes could reinforce each other in an
equilibrium with unhedged rms and pegged exchange rates.
Over the past decade, an extensive literature has used macroeconomic data to expore the
relationship between exchange rate regimes and currency mismatches.1 This literature is
based on the argument that pegging the currency is more credible in the short run. If rms
are taking higher risks in response to a peg, it should result in greater short term foreign
currency denominated credit. However, few studies nd strong empirical support for the
hypothesis (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999).
Empirical studies using rm level data nd some support for the moral hazard hypothesis
for Latin America, Mexico and East Asia. Kamil (2006) and Martinez and Werner (2002)
nd that moving to more 
exible regimes reduced currency mismatches on balance sheets
of rms. Parsley and Popper (2006) nd that rms in East Asia were less hedged under
pegged exchange rates. However, with cross country evidence, it is dicult to distinguish
between the incomplete markets and the moral hazard hypotheses.
This paper complements the existing literature by explicitly examining the incomplete
market versus the moral hazard view in the context of volatility changes under a pegged
currency regime. India provides a unique natural experiment, where we can study the
response of a set of rms placed under alternating high and low volatility phases of a pegged
exchange rate regime. The rupee has been pegged to the USD in the period 1993-2006,
1For a review of this literature see Luca and Zhang (2006).
3but four distinct periods of signicantly dierent currency volatility can be identied. The
rst period beginning in 1993 when the rupee moved away from an administered exchange
rate was a period of low currency volatility. This was followed by a period of high volatility
during the Asian crisis. The third period identied witnessed low volatility, followed by the
fourth of high volatility. The extent of market completeness, in terms of capital controls
or access to currency derivatives, did not fundamentally change. The empirical strategy of
the paper derives strength from the fact that a stable set of rms, where a sound metric of
currency exposure is obtained, are observed through three signicant changes in currency

exibility.
Under this natural experiment, the incomplete markets and moral hazard hypotheses have
dierent predictions. If rms are unable to hedge their foreign exchange exposure risk,
owing to incomplete markets, higher currency volatility should not aect the currency
exposure of rms. If the incomplete market hypothesis were true, we would nd that
whether the currency volatility was high or low, unhedged currency exposure of rms
remains unchanged. If the moral hazard hypothesis were true, and rms carry currency
risk in response to the 
exibility of the currency, we should nd that periods of low volatility
have high unhedged currency risk, and vice versa.
Our results strongly support the moral hazard hypothesis. We nd that in Period 1, when
there was negligible currency volatility, rms had large exposures. This gave way to the
high currency volatility of Period 2: we nd that currency exposure of rms became very
low. In Period 3, currency volatility was low and rms responded with increased unhedged
exposure. Period 4 witnessed an increase in volatility and a reduction in unhedged currency
exposure.
In addition to questions about the magnitude of unhedged currency exposure, we also ask
questions about the direction of exposure. Was there homogeneity in the direction of the
currency exposure of rms? Did rms see a one-way bet on the exchange rate? Our results
suggest that in periods 3 and 4, rms as a whole were betting on currency appreciation.
These were periods where the central bank was buying foreign currencies at a high rate
in an attempt to undervalue the rupee. Period 4 is a particularly interesting case: while
currency volatility had risen, the government continued to sell rupees on the currency
market at a high rate. Higher volatility in Period 4 was associated with a reduction in
unhedged currency exposure of rms, but we nd that rms, as a whole, had a highly
statistically signicant bet on appreciation.
In summary, our results suggest that in a natural experiment where market completeness
was unchanged, the currency exposure of rms responded powerfully to the implicit guar-
antees made by the government in the currency regime. When the government tightly
managed the exchange rate, rms carried substantial currency exposure. When there was
greater currency 
exibility, rms switched to lower unhedged exposures.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 describes the rm level
data set, the methodology for the identication of structural breaks in currency 
exibility
4and measurement of currency exposure of rms. Section 3 discusses the impact of changes
in currency 
exibility on the magnitude and direction of currency exposure of rms. Section
4 concludes.
2 Data and methodology
This section describes the data and methodology used this study. The rst part explains
the structural breaks methodology for the identication of episodes of currency volatil-
ity in India. The second part describes the rm level data set. The third outlines the
methodology used for measuring currency exposure.
2.1 Structural breaks in currency 
exibility
The INR currency regime has been de facto pegged to the USD over the full period. The
extent of pegging has varied signicantly through this period. There have been multi-
month periods where the INR/USD exchange rate was xed, and there have been periods
where the volatility of the INR/USD was much higher.
The Reserve Bank of India has not announced any change in the currency regime since
the move to a \market determined rate" in 1993. The rupee has been classied as a man-
aged 
oat by the IMF AREARS (Annual Report on Exchange Agreements and Exchange
Restrictions). Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogo (2004) and Patnaik (2007)
present evidence that the rupee was a de facto peg to the USD.
Due to domestic and external compulsions, rupee volatility varied sharply during this
period.2 Hence, within the broad framework of a INR/USD pegged exchange rate, there
was important variation of INR/USD volatility in sub-periods. We use the Bai and Perron
(2003) algorithm as implemented by Zeileis et al. (2005) to identify structural breaks in
exchange rate volatility.3
Figure 1 shows the time-series of squared weekly returns on the INR/USD exchange rate,
with the break dates isolated by the Bai and Perron (2003) algorithm superposed. The
three break dates identify four distinct periods:
Period 1: 2 April 1993 to 17 February 1995 This was a period of low volatility. For most
of this period, the rupee stood at Rs.31.37 per dollar.
2The evolution of the currency regime re
ected compulsions rooted in monetary policy and the evolution
of capital controls (Patnaik, 2005; Shah and Patnaik, 2007). These in
uenced the Reserve Bank's decision
to permit higher currency volatility in certain periods.
3To estimate structural breaks, the exchange-rate time-series is re-expressed as a time-series of weekly
returns. The Bai and Perron (2003) algorithm is applied to the ols regression logr2 = a0. This yields a













































Figure 1: Squared weekly returns on the INR/USD exchange rate and structural break
dates.
INR/USD Reserves addition (Bln. USD)
Dates Weekly vol. Overall Per year
1 1993-04-01 - 1995-02-17 0.16 13.03 6.93
2 1995-02-17 - 1998-08-21 0.93 4.86 1.39
3 1998-08-21 - 2004-03-19 0.29 82.64 14.81
4 2004-03-19 - 2007-02-12 0.61 79.76 27.50
Table 1: The four periods
Period 2: 18 February 1995 to 21 August 1998 This period included the Asian crisis, and
there was a sharp increase in currency volatility.
Period 3: 22 August 1998 to 19 March 2004 This was a period of tight pegging, with low
volatility and some appreciation.
Period 4: 20 March 2004 to 12 February 2007 In this period, there was greater currency

exibility. However, currency 
exibility was lower than in Period 2.
Table 1 shows the currency volatility of the INR/USD exchange rate across these four
periods. Currency volatility was highly heterogeneous across the four periods. It moved
from 0.16% per week in Period 1 to a nearly six-times higher level of 0.93% per week in
Period 2. In Period 3 it dropped to one-third (to 0.29) and then roughly doubled (to 0.61)
in period 4. These were large changes in currency volatility.
Over the full period, India had restrictions on the capital account. Financial derivatives
were not well developed and there were restrictions on participation in these markets.
Financial markets grew and developed over this period without major setbacks, policy





























RBI purchase (right scale)
Figure 2: Foreign currency purchases by RBI, and reserves
reversals or structural breaks.4 From the viewpoint of experimental design, there was a
broadly consistent policy environment. Through the entire period, no announcements were
made about the nature of the currency regime or currency volatility. Firms had to look
at data on exchange rates and form their own assessment about the outlook for currency
risk.
The dates of structural break identied above have interesting economic interpretations
when juxtaposed against the foreign currency reserves and purchases of the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI). Figure 2 shows the monthly time-series of foreign currency reserves and
of net purchase of foreign exchange by RBI. The three vertical lines demarcate the four
periods that we examine.
For Period 1, the rupee had just shifted into the new `market determined exchange rate'.
Data for net purchase has not been released, and there was a small buildup of reserves.
Within Period 2, the period of the Asian crisis, a small decline in reserves took place and
the currency moved sharply. In Period 3, there was sustained currency intervention almost
entirely on one side of the market, and reserves rose dramatically. This may have been a
period when economic agents felt that the currency was likely to appreciate. Finally, in
Period 4, while intervention data shows a less sustained pattern, the presence of enormous
reserves would suggest to economic agents that a sudden depreciation was unlikely.
As is visible in Table 1, the characteristics of the four periods can be summarised in two
dimensions. In Periods 1 and 3, currency volatility was low. In Periods 3 and 4, the pace
of reserves accretion was high.
4See Thomas (2006) for a comprehensive description of the evolution of nancial markets in this period.
7The CMIE Cospi is a set of roughly 2,500 listed rms in India which trade on atleast 66% of trading days.
It constitutes the universe of Indian listed rms, for all practical purposes. The 100 rms in Nifty and
Nifty Junior, which are used in this paper, account for an economically signicant part of this universe.
(Trillion Rupees)
Set Market value Value added
CMIE Cospi (2500 rms) 35.3 4.74
Nifty (50 rms) 19.6 2.33
Nifty Junior (50 rms) 3.3 0.71
Fraction accounted for by 100 rms 0.65 0.64
Table 2: Weight of 100 sample rms in overall equity market and value added
2.2 The rm-level data set
Firm-level empirical work in developing countries, where nancial markets are not well-
developed, often uses balance sheet data to study currency mismatches (Kamil, 2006;
Cowan et al., 2004; Martinez and Werner, 2002). Balance sheet data suers from the
obvious limitation that it does not show o-balance sheet information. Currency exposures
observed in balance sheet data may be misleading if the exposure is hedged o-balance
sheet; conversely, rms seeking to speculate on exchange rate changes may use o-balance
sheet exposures to obtain currency exposure.
Compared with many developing countries, India has the advantage of high participation
in nancial markets and active speculative price discovery on the stock market. As an
example, the 3rd and 5th biggest exchanges of the world, measured by the number of
transactions per year, are found in India. This makes an exposure metric derived from
stock prices relatively informative.
We construct a data set of 100 most liquid stocks on Indian stock exchanges. These are
the rms that belong to the `NSE-50' (Nifty) and `Nifty Junior' stock market indexes.
The prime rationale for choosing these 100 rms lies in the informativeness of their stock
price processes, given the high level of stock market liquidity. In terms of market turnover,
these 100 rms account for 58% of the turnover of the spot market. Index derivatives and
individual-stock derivatives on these 100 stocks account for 92% of total equity derivatives
turnover.5
5The methodology for construction of Nifty and Nifty Junior (Shah and Thomas, 1998) is based on
computing the impact cost when placing program trades to buy or sell the entire index as a portfolio,
into four `snapshots' of the limit order book every day. The biggest rms of the country are selected into
these two indexes, while ensuring that the overall impact cost of index program trades remains low. As an
example, in 2006, the average impact cost for doing a Rs.5 million program trade on Nifty was 0.08% and
the impact cost for doing a Rs.2.5 million program trade on Nifty Junior was 0.16%. These transactions
costs are comparable with program trades on indexes in industrial countries, and underline the high quality
of stock market liquidity and informativeness of the stock prices in the dataset.
8In addition, Table 2 shows that these 100 rms account for roughly two-thirds of the value
added and market value of non-trivial listed rms in India. The value added by these
100 rms amounts to roughly 10% of India's GDP. Hence, this dataset of 100 rms is
simultaneously a set of rms where risk measurement based on stock price sensitivity is
meaningful, and a set of rms which is representive of the currency exposure of Indian
rms at large.
2.3 Measuring currency exposure
We measure unhedged currency exposure in the tradition of Adler and Dumas (1984). We
build on the work of Dominguez and Tesar (2006); Parsley and Popper (2006); Dahlquist
and Robertsson (2001); Jorion (1990); Bodnar and Wong (2000) and measure the change
in the stock price of a company in response to a change in the exchange rate. To measure
the unhedged currency exposure of rms we utilize an `augmented market model':
rj = j + 1jrM1 + 2jrM2 +  (1)
The model relates rm returns rj to market index movements rM1 and currency 
uctuations
rM2. The coecient 2j measures the sensitivity of the valuation of rm j to changes in
the exchange rate. If an exporting rm is unhedged and gains when there is a currency
depreciation, it would have 2j > 0.
In an ecient market, market model parameters re
ect the eorts of speculative markets
at putting together all aspects of currency exposure of the rm. If a rm sells a product
which is priced through import parity, stock market speculators who form a judgment about
future prots of the rm will embed currency 
uctuations into the stock price process, even
when it does not appear in balance sheet disclosures about currency exposure.
We follow Parsley and Popper (2006) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) in focusing on a
bilateral exchange rate, the INR/USD, in contrast to other studies such as Dominguez and
Tesar (2006) who have used trade-weighted exchange rates to measure currency exposure.
A focus on the USD in gauging the currency exposure of rms in India is consistent with
(a) the fact that the INR is a de facto peg to the USD; (b) key trade partners such as the
US, China, Hong Kong and UAE are all pegged to the USD and (c) considerable trade
invoicing takes place in USD.6
The stock price of a rm at any point of time takes into account all information available
at that point. The stock market price is likely to respond only to unanticipated changes
in the exchange rate (Doukas et al., 2001). To measure the response of the stock market
6In order to explore the signicance of exposures other than the USD, augmented market models were
estimated for the biggest 20 companies by market capitalisation, where Euro, Pound and Yen exposures
were measured in addition to the USD. These were not signicant.
9to innovations, rather than levels in the exchange rate, we examine the time series char-
acteristics of the INR/USD exchange rate. We nd that the time-series of the INR/USD
exchange rate often deviates from a random walk. ARMA identication based on the
Akaike Information Criterion suggests that rM2 often has an AR time-series structure.7
This suggests shifting from raw currency market returns, rM2, to ARMA innovations, et.
This is done separately in each of the four periods to model and utilise the nature of the
currency process prevalent in the period under examination.
The full impact of a currency innovation takes place over several time-periods, which
requires introducing a set of lags into the estimating equation. Tests with a series of
individual stocks suggested that the impact of a shock was fully absorbed in no more than
4 lags of weekly data. This implies the model specication:
rjt = j + 1jrM1;t +
4 X
i=0
aijet i + t (2)
Under this specication, an innovation et on the currency market has an impact on the
stock price in week t and in the following 4 weeks.
Under model 2, currency exposure is embedded in the vector of aij coecients; it is no
longer a simple scalar 2j as was the case under model 1. The metric of currency ex-
posure of the rm that we utilise is  2j =
P
ai. Inference procedures for  2j are based
on a heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix (Andrews and
Monahan, 1992) for the OLS estimates of equation 2. This gives us an estimate 2j, of
the dispersion of the distribution of  2j.8 Table 3 shows one example of this estimation
strategy.
Through this process, for each rm j, estimates for currency exposure  2j and the standard
deviation of the estimate 2j are obtained.
The direction of unhedged currency exposure may dier across rms. Some rms may
benet from an appreciation ( 2j < 0), while others may benet from a depreciation
7Based on the AIC, the overall weekly returns time-series of the INR/USD exchange rate appears to





However, the time-series process of the currency varies signicantly across the four periods which were
identied when analysing the currency regime. In the rst period, INR/USD returns were AR(3) with
pronounced mean reversion. In the second period, it was an AR(1) with a positive coecient. In the third
period, it was an AR(10). In the fourth period, there was no AR structure.
8Let  be the OLS estimate. We dene w = [0;0;1;1;1;1;1]. Our exposure metric  2j =
P
ai = w0.
We obtain , a consistent estimate of Var(). This is used to compute Var( 2j) = w0w.
10This table shows an example of estimation of equation 2 and hence  2j for one rm: Satyam Computer
Services, in period 4. This is an export oriented software services rm. The typical exposure expected
of an incompletely hedged exporting rm is aij > 0 where positive stock market returns take place in
response to a currency depreciation.
In the case of Satyam, there is a contemporaneous response of 1.0339, which is statistically signicant.
In other words, a currency innovation of 1% induces stock market returns of 1.0339% in the same week.
However, the currency innovation of week 0 continues to trickle into the stock price over the next four
weeks, with positive coecients for e1;e2;e3 and e4. The ve aij estimates add up to a total impact of
2.4389.
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>jtj)
(Intercept) 0.2471 0.2750 0.90 0.3708
rM1 0.9194 0.0960 9.57 0.0000
e0 1.0339 0.5026 2.06 0.0420
e1 0.2789 0.4568 0.61 0.5428
e2 0.1933 0.4688 0.41 0.6809
e3 0.6478 0.4494 1.44 0.1523
e4 0.2851 0.4390 0.65 0.5173
R2 0.4697
 2j 2.4389 0.8837 2.76
Table 3: Measurement of currency exposure at the rm level: An example
( 2j > 0). To focus on currency exposure, regardless of the sign, we use j 2jj as the metric
of unhedged currency exposure.
The inference procedure for the average, j2j = E(j 2jj), uses a simulation-based strategy.
In each simulation, one draw is made from the distribution of  2j for each rm, and j2j is
computed using these values. This is repeated 5000 times, which yields 5000 draws from
the distribution of j2j. Summary statistics and kernel density plots are reported using
these draws.
3 Firm level evidence
This section describes our results. The rst part discusses variation in the level of cur-
rency exposure, regardless of the direction. The second examines the direction of currency
exposure of rms.
3.1 Changes in currency exposure
Table 4 shows summary statistics about the cross-sectional dispersion of j 2jj in each
period.
11This table shows summary statistics about the j 2jj values obtained across rms in the four periods.
Period Q1 Median Mean Q3
1 3.04 5.83 9.03 10.82
2 0.34 0.58 0.76 0.93
3 0.89 1.80 2.29 3.24
4 0.34 0.86 1.14 1.60
Table 4: Summary statistics about the cross-section of j 2jj in 4 periods





Table 5: j2j estimates, along with simulation-based inference
In Period 1, where currency 
exibility was very limited, the exposure of rms was consid-
erable. The 25th percentile was 3.04 and the 75th percentile was 10.82.
In Period 2, when the highest currency volatility was observed, the exposure of rms fell
dramatically. The 25th percentile dropped to 0.34 and the 75th percentile dropped to 0.93.
In Period 3, where currency 
exibility once again dropped, though not all the way to the
levels of period 1, the 25th percentile rose to 0.89 and the 75th percentile climbed to 3.24.
Finally, in Period 4, where greater currency volatility came about (though not up to the
levels of Period 2), currency risk dropped sharply, with a 25th percentile of 0.34 and a 75th
percentile of 1.60.
Currency volatility in the four periods took the values of : 0.16, 0.93, 0.29, 0.61. The
median exposure of rms responded in ways which are consistent with a moral hazard
hypothesis, with values of: 5.83, 0.58, 1.80, 0.86.
The simulation-based inference strategy described in Section 2.3 gives us j2j, the mean of
j 2jj across rms along with an estimate of its sampling variation. These results are shown
in Table 5.
For all the transitions from one period to the next, the change in the mean exposure is
highly signicant. As an example, the 95% condence interval in Period 3 runs from 2.94
to 3.95, while the 95% condence interval in Period 4 runs from 1.299 to 1.686. We infer
that at a high level of signicance, j2j was lower in Period 4 when compared with Period
3.
Figure 3 visually compares kernel density plots for the distribution of j2j in the four











































































Figure 3: Distribution of j2j in the four periods 13periods. The lack of overlap of consecutive distributions supports the hypothesis that each
time currency volatility changed, the exposure of rms changed. In comparing Period 2
and Period 4, while the currency volatility was dierent (0.93 vs. 0.61), the distributions
of j2j overlap signicantly; we cannot reject the null of no-dierence in j2j. Apart from
this case, pairwise comparisons for all the four periods reveal clearly distinct distributions
for j2j.
In summary, we nd that when currency volatility switched from a low level in Period 1 to
a high level in Period 2, the currency exposure of rms dropped sharply. When currency
volatility dropped again in Period 3, the exposure of rms went up. Finally, when currency
volatility rose again in Period 4, the exposure of rms went down.
This evidence represents one key nding of this paper: that changes in currency 
exibility
were associated with signicant changes of the currency exposure of rms. Markets were
developed enough to give rms the instruments through which they were able to raise or
lower their currency exposure in response to changes in currency 
exibility. The switch
from carrying low to high unhedged currency exposure was a response to lower currency
volatility. This result supports the moral hazard hypothesis on the unhedged currency
exposure of rms.
3.2 Direction of exposure
Our results so far have focused on summarising the cross-sectional distribution of j 2jj: the
sensitivity of stock returns to currency returns, without concern for the direction of rm
exposure. However, pegged exchange rates are known to sometimes induce one-way bets
on the exchange rate. In this case, the speculative views of rms could converge.
When the central bank consistently buys dollars to prevent appreciation and accumulates
large foreign exchange reserves, economic agents are likely to infer (a) that INR appreci-
ation is likely and (b) that a large sudden depreciation is unlikely. Conversely, at a time
when the central bank is defending the currency with continual sale of reserves, economic
agents are likely to infer that (a) that INR depreciation is likely and (b) a large sudden
depreciation could occur.
Did rms feel that the currency was sometimes a one-way bet, and choose similar  2j
values in a period? In order to investigate this, we explore the cross-section of  2j seen in
the four periods. We summarise this using the mean of  2j: the currency exposure of the
overall sample, even after positive and negative exposures are allowed to cancel out. Thus,
2 = E( 2j) is a measure of the overall currency exposure of the rms of India, as distinct
from j2j, which measured whether rms had currency exposure (regardless of direction).
Assuming that  2j estimates across N rms are independent, our inference procedures are





Table 6 shows summary statistics of the  2j values obtained, without shifting to absolute
14This table shows the cross-sectional variation of  2j in the four periods.
Period Q1 Median Mean Q3
1 -4.765 2.567 2.635 7.729
2 -0.678 -0.354 -0.200 0.250
3 -2.818 -0.688 -0.835 0.961
4 -1.542 -0.378 -0.673 0.216
Table 6: Cross-section variation of  2j





Table 7:  2 estimates
values as was done earlier.
In Period 1, the mean and median values were positive and roughly 2.5%. In other words,
on average, rms stood to benet by 2.5% in the event of a 1% depreciation. This may
have re
ected the considerable uncertainties of Period 1, when the new `market deter-
mined exchange rate' regime had just begun, reserves were small, and there were fears of
a depreciation.
In Period 2, the mean exposure shifted dramatically to -0.2. With greater currency 
ex-
ibility, rms were unsure about how the currency would move, and the overall average
exposure dropped to small values.
In Period 3, there were expectations of an INR appreciation. The mean exposure shifted
to -0.835: rm value stood to gain by 0.835% in the event of a 1% appreciation.
Finally, in Period 4, re
ecting greater volatility, the mean rm exposure declined to -
0.673%.
In order to judge their statistical signicance of these descriptive statistics, Table 7 shows
results for  2 across the four periods.
In Period 1, while the estimated  2 is 2.6325, where rms as a whole appear to have set
themselves up to prot from a depreciation, the standard error of this estimate was 1.609.
It is, then, not possible to reject H0 :  2 = 0.
Similarly, in Period 2, while the estimated  2 was -0.2, where rms as a whole appear to
have set themselves up to prot slightly from an appreciation, the standard error of this
estimate was 0.125 and it is not possible to reject H0 :  2 = 0.
15Statistical signicance is found in Periods 3 and 4. In both these periods, rms appear to
have set themselves up to prot from an appreciation, with `t' statistics of 2.27 and 5.52
respectively. Hence, in Periods 3 and 4, there is evidence of homogeneity of rm exposure,
of rms as a whole perceiving a one-way bet that the INR was going to appreciate.
We can reject the null of no-change9 of the distribution of 2j across consecutive periods:
each time the currency regime changed, the distribution of 2j changed.
In the analysis of j2j, there was clear evidence that across all four periods, the change
in rm exposure was signicant. However, the analysis of  2 suggests that there was
signicant heterogeneity of expectations on the part of rms in Period 1 and 2. Some rms
placed a bet on appreciation while some rms placed a bet on depreciation.
In contrast, when we come to Periods 3 and 4, the results are qualitatively dierent. Table
5 shows that the size of exposures in Period 4 dropped to less than half that of Period 3.
However, in both these periods, rms appear to have felt there was a one-way bet where
INR appreciation was likely, or conversely, that a substantial INR depreciation was not
going to take place.
Period 4 is a striking situation, where currency volatility was higher, and j2j dropped
sharply. However, a strong homogeneity of views is found; we can condently reject H0 :
 2 = 0. Firms seemed to expect that there is little risk of a large INR depreciation, and
perceived a one-way bet that INR appreciation is likely.
4 Conclusions
This paper shows that in the Indian setting, implicit guarantees oered by the central
bank shape the behaviour of rms. Firms choose to hedge or not hedge their exposures
depending on whether exchange rate 
exibility is high or low { in each of three transitions
of the currency regime, substantial changes in rm exposure took place. In addition,
large reserves and sustained reserves accumulation seems to generate homogeneity of views
amongst rms encouraging rms to believe that the rupee would not depreciate. These
results support the hypothesis that pegged exchange rates and large reserves holdings
induce moral hazard and increase nancial fragility.
These results pertain to the Indian setting, where nancial markets gave rms adequate
opportunities to modify their currency exposure. In countries where nancial markets are
underdeveloped, central banks may peg the currency in response to balance sheet mis-
matches based on an incomplete markets argument. This paper nds that in the Indian
9Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests applied to the distribution of 2j across consecutive periods show that the
null of identical distributions is rejected with prob values of 3:056  10 8 for the transition from Period 1
to Period 2; a prob value of 1:1815  10 5 for the transition from Period 2 to Period 3 and a prob value
of 0.0496 for the transition from Period 3 to Period 4.
16setting, markets were complete enough to allow rms to modify their currency exposure,
that the implicit government guarantee provided through low currency volatility incen-
tivises rms to carry unhedged exposure.
In this paper, a cross-sectional exploration of rm characteristics, seeking to understand
which rms hold bigger currency exposure, has not been undertaken. The pattern of
ownership, especially the role played by government ownership and its impact on incentives,
could be a factor shaping the decisions of rms. This is left to future research.
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